

Elections, Electoral Systems and Party Systems in the Visegrad States, 2005-2006

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Introduction

The elections of 2005 and 2006 have been crucial markers in the political development of the Visegrad region, as they have been the first elections held since the accession of these states to the European Union in May 2004. The parliamentary elections in Poland last September, together with the electoral contests this year in April in Hungary and in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in June provide an excellent opportunity to evaluate overall trends in electoral and party system development in the region. I leave it to country experts to investigate the relevance of the electoral contests in individual states. What I would like to do is to draw out some of the overall patterns in political development that have been thrown to light by these elections. The aim of this exercise is to situate these patterns in the broader context of developments in the Central and Eastern European region in order to identify the characteristic features of the Visegrad Group countries and how they differ from their post-communist neighbours. In so doing, I shall focus mainly on the nexus between the two key foci of this workshop: electoral systems and party systems. The main question I want to address, then, is: how the Visegrad states are distinctive in the post-communist European context, and what lessons we can draw from their distinctiveness.

But first it is worthwhile pausing to consider what we are not discussing, for this provides a useful indicator of the meaning of elections in the region. This workshop has not, for example, chosen to focus on widespread electoral manipulation and fraud, the way similar workshop a couple of years ago on the former Soviet region might have done. Nor has it chosen to focus on large scale reform of the overall architecture of the electoral system, as electoral systems in the Visegrad states have remained relatively stable in recent years (despite quite a bit of tinkering at the edges). Finally, this workshop has not chosen to focus on the quality of electoral administration, for this does not appear to be widely viewed as a major problem in the region.

Also important is what the workshop has chosen to highlight: electoral systems and party systems. These twin pillars of democratic institutionalisation are vital to any

representative system. They are also intimately linked, in as much as electoral systems are one of the most important factors in shaping party systems. The very fact that the link between the two systems functions more or less the same way in the Visegrad countries as it functions in established democracies is testimony to the progress made by these countries in democratic consolidation. Though the relatively short period since the transitions of 1989 provides scant evidence with which to discern long-term trends, the overall quantitative characteristics of electoral competition in the Visegrad region are well within the bounds of European norms.

These states are also interesting in comparative perspective for a variety of reasons. Though they are now integrated into Western European political structures, their patterns of electoral competition still bear the mark of the communist past. At the same time, they are arguably the most politically advanced of the post-communist states, and they thus serve as a benchmark against which political progress in other parts of the post-communist region can be compared. The 2005-2006 elections are especially interesting in this regard, for they represent the first set of elections in which the exigencies of European Union accession were no longer constraining political activity. Up until May 2004, the states in the Visegrad region were under strong pressure to demonstrate their democratic credentials in order to secure a place in the EU, but now that this has been achieved, political competition is arguably freer to reflect the true sentiments of politicians and citizens alike. This may be why we have seen the incorporation of a far-right party into government in Poland (as happened also in Austria in the parliamentary election immediately following its accession). This factor may likewise help to explain the virulence of the recent demonstrations in Hungary. But whatever the causal processes involved in these events, it is fair to say that the Visegrad states have now 'come of age' electorally.

Overview of Electoral Trends in the Visegrad States

It is worth reminding ourselves first of the basic similarities in electoral system design both within the post-communist region and between Eastern and Western Europe. There has been a gradual convergence on proportional representation across the continent (with several notable exceptions), though for different reasons. Whereas the move to PR was in the West of the continent brought about at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries by a perceived need for greater predictability in electoral outcomes combined with perceptions of party interest (Carstairs, 1980; Boix, 1999), in Eastern Europe parties as entities were only in their nascent stages at the time of the grand overhauls of electoral architecture that occurred at the time of the transitions from communism. Indeed, it was largely in the aim of consolidating parties and multi-party politics and preventing personalised patronage-based forms of electoral competition that PR was adopted in the post-communist region (Birch *et al.*, 2002). The relatively fragmented party systems evident in the early post-transitional period were then 'tamed' by legal thresholds that are high by the standards of established democracies (Shvetsova, 1999; Bielasiak, 1999; Birch, 2003a).

With the exception of Hungary, all the states in the Visegrad region have proportional representation electoral systems. These are in general associated with higher

rates of electoral participation (including in the post-communist European region; Kostadinova, 2003; Birch, 2003b; 2007), yet turnout in the Visegrad states is slightly lower than the average for the post-communist countries as a whole (see Table 1). The difference is very slight – 60.18 per cent in the most recent parliamentary elections in the region overall as opposed to 58.82 per cent in the Visegrad countries – but this finding nevertheless bucks the trend of more proportional electoral systems being associated with higher levels of electoral participation. Moreover, there have been some considerable falls in turnout in the most recent elections, falls that cannot possibly be attributable to electoral system design (which has hardly changed). Data on rates of electoral participation since the end of the communist period are presented in Table 2. The post-communist period has seen turnout go down steadily, with the exception of Hungary, where turnout has fluctuated relatively trendlessly since the first post-communist polls. In the most recent parliamentary elections, this figure has gone up slightly in the Czech Republic, down slightly in Hungary and Poland, and down considerably in Slovakia.¹ There are a variety of factors that account for these patterns (Kostadinova, 2003; Pacek *et al.*, 2005), but suffice it to say, that the introduction of proportional representation does not seem to have been a measure adequate to keep turnout particularly high, and the trend in electoral participation in the region continues to be a cause for concern in democratic terms.

Another important indicator of electoral outcomes is the proportion of votes that are excluded from representation, in the sense of votes cast for parties that fail to achieve parliamentary representation at all. This is an relevant measure, in that it provides an indication of the extent to which party systems are serving their most basic function of representing electorates. Representational exclusion in post-communist Europe has been relatively high in comparison with established democracies (Shvetsova, 1999; Birch, 2003b; Bielasiak, 2005). The Russian Duma election of 1995 is a well-known example; only four parties, winning between them almost exactly 50 per cent of the vote, managed to cross the five per cent threshold on the PR component of the ballot, meaning that the votes of half the electorate were excluded from representation through PR lists.

Yet on this measure, the most recent elections in the Visegrad region provide evidence that the party systems here are performing relatively well. As can be seen from Table 1, the average percentage of votes excluded from representation in the Visegrad states is notably lower than the average for the post-communist states overall – 7.24 per cent in the Visegrad states as against 10.40 per cent in the entire post-communist region. Moreover, exclusion has diminished markedly over the course of the past decade and a half, from an average of 22.4 per cent in the second post-communist elections to only 9.0 per cent in the sixth elections (see Table 3). Thus while the citizens of the Visegrad Group region are no more likely to participate in elections than is the case elsewhere in the post-communist lands, their votes are more likely to ‘count’.

¹ The figures in this table would seem to indicate that the decline in turnout leveled off in the sixth post-communist elections, but the true situation will only become clear when Hungary and Poland have held their sixth elections. The generally low levels of electoral participation in Poland suggest that once Poland’s next parliamentary elections have been taken into consideration, the average for the region will probably have witnessed a further fall.

When we look at individual Visegrad states, however, we see that there is considerable variation (see Table 3). The 2006 Hungarian elections virtually all votes in both parts of this country's mixed electoral system went to parties and coalitions that succeeded in achieving representation in parliament. This is a significant feat, given the relatively high levels of representational exclusion in many post-communist states. It suggests that, whatever the ills of the Hungarian party system, it has been at the very least been successful in providing a voice in parliament to virtually all sectors of the electorate. This also provides additional evidence to support the well-known view that the Hungarian party system is among the most consolidated in the post-communist world.

Electoral Systems and Party Systems in the Visegrad States

The size and 'shape' of party systems are themes that have long fascinated students of modern politics. These are also the topics that are most frequently debated in discussions of electoral systems; the propensity of electoral systems to either to fragment or to consolidate party systems was the central concern of the literature on electoral systems for several decades. There are two ways of looking at this figure, the 'effective' number of parties elected to parliament (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), which provides an indication of the overall size of the party system, and the seat share of the largest party, which gives an idea of the 'shape' of that system, in other words of the extent to which a single party dominates the party system.

Party system size has been higher in the post-communist region than in many established democracies, though it has diminished considerably since the early post-transitional years (Shvetsova, 1999; Bielasia, 2002; 2005). It is clear from Table 1 that the Visegrad countries are typical of the post-communist region in terms of both the size of the party system and the seat share of the largest party. The average effective number of parties in the most recent parliamentary elections is 3.91 in the region overall, and 3.64 in the Visegrad states. Likewise the average seat share of the largest party is 37.62 per cent in the entire post-communist region, and almost identical figure – 38.93 per cent - in the Visegrad region. What distinguishes the Visegrad states from the other post-communist polities is the lack of extreme values on each of these indicators. In other post-communist states, we observe highly concentrated party systems, as, for example, in Georgia, where the most recent parliamentary elections led to an effective number of parties of only 2.00 and the largest party won 68.81 per cent of the seats.² In Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, the parliamentary elections of 2002 yielded almost eight 'effective' parties, with the largest winning only 21.92 per cent of the seats. Thus, outside the Visegrad states relatively moderate average values on these indicators mask considerable variation.

² It is worth pointing out that the single-member district component of the resulting parliament was elected in 2003, prior to the major shake-up of the party system that arose out of subsequent protests (see Jones, 2005). When the PR component of the election was re-run in 2004, the largest party won a full 90 per cent of the seats, and one can speculate that had the entire election been re-run in 2004, single-party domination might well have been even more pronounced.

In the Visegrad, the figures from the most recent elections are more moderate across the board, with effective numbers of parliamentary parties ranging from 2.40 in Hungary to 4.81 in Slovakia, and the seat share of the largest party ranging from 33.33 per cent in Slovakia to 48.19 per cent in Hungary. Thus, while Hungary appears to have the smallest party system and Slovakia the largest, the variation is well within the ‘norm’ for democracies. It is worth noting, however, that in no case did a party win an absolute majority of the seats in the most recent elections in the Visegrad region, undoubtedly due to the strong proportional element to the electoral systems there, and the smaller party system in Hungary is most likely due – among other things – to the presence of single-member districts in that country’s electoral system.

A wealth of previous comparative research has found that more proportional electoral systems are associated with larger party systems (Rae, 1971; Katz, 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000), and this relationship has been found to hold, broadly speaking, in post-communist Europe as well (Moser, 1999; Birch, 2003b; Bielasiak, 2002). In the sample of post-communist states listed in Table 1, we observe that those with pure PR systems have an average effective number of parties of 4.23, whereas the corresponding figure for mixed/SMD systems is 3.21. In the light of this finding, Hungary’s relatively compact party system makes sense.

Turning to trends over time among the Visegrad states, we observe in Table 4 that there is also a high degree of temporal stability in the overall size of party systems. The exceptionally high figure of 10.89 effective parties in the 1991 Polish elections raises the average for first elections, but after that, the average for the region hovers around four. There have been some unusually low figures, such as the 2.90 in Hungary in 1994 and 2.21 in the same country in 2002; likewise Slovakia exhibited exceptionally large party systems in the same years – 6.97 in 1994 and 6.12 in 2002, but overall, the effective number of parliamentary parties has remained moderate in the Visegrad states throughout the post-communist period.

The same can also be said for the seat share of the largest party (see Table 5). The average seat share won by the largest party in the Visegrad states has varied around a moderate level of 40 per cent during the course of the post-communist period, with few extreme figures (save, again, for the highly fragmenting Polish election of 1991, where the largest party won only 13.47 per cent of the seats, and the Slovak elections of 2002, where the corresponding percentage was 24.00 per cent). It is noteworthy that there have only been two cases of absolute majority wins over this period – the Civic Forum’s 63.50 per cent vote share in the 1990 National Council elections, and the Hungarian Socialist party’s majority of 54.15 per cent in the elections of 1994. This is what we would expect in predominantly proportional electoral systems; under ‘ordinary’ democratic conditions, the largest party can be expected to win a significant share of the seats, but not an absolute majority. The situation in the Visegrad contrasts with that in a number of other post-communist states, where the largest parties have won either significantly more or significantly fewer seats. The most fragmented electoral outcome among the most recent electoral contests in the region is that of Belarus in 2004, where the largest party won a mere 7.27 per cent of the seats in parliament, 89.09 per cent of which went to independents. At the other extreme, the Georgian elections held in 2003-2004 saw 68.81 per cent of the parliamentary seats go to the National Movement-Democrats. Certainly

these sorts of extreme results have not been found in the Visegrad states following the transitional elections of 1990-1991.

Conclusions

Elections are key events in the political life of any country. Not only do they provide a thermometer for measuring a variety of trends in popular attitudes, they also reflect the state of political party organisation and the abilities of parties to connect with the electorate. The 2005-2006 elections in the Visegrad countries have come over a decade and a half following the revolutionary transitions from communism that occurred in the late 1980s. They thus represent an opportunity for scholars to reflect on the extent to which party and electoral systems have been consolidated in the region, and to evaluate a range of indicators of democratic development.

Overall, the results of the 2005-2006 cycle of parliamentary elections in the Visegrad states provide evidence that democratic politics is becoming regularised. Certainly in comparison with the other post-communist states, the Visegrad region exhibits a number of characteristics of consolidation; though the Visegrad averages for the various indicators examined here are generally similar to the averages for the post-communist region overall, the Visegrad countries are characterised by a paucity of extreme results, especially in the latter period. This marks these states out from a number of their post-communist neighbours, where electoral results are often far less balanced. Whatever the deficiencies of the dominantly PR electoral systems in the Visegrad region, they have certainly not hindered these countries from establishing patterns of electoral competition that – quantitatively speaking at least – resemble those of established democracies.

Confidence in the electoral process is also relatively high in this region; allegations of widespread electoral fraud and abuse are not nearly as common as is the case further east. Election surveys conducted in the mid-1990s as part of the first module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project found that in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, over 70 per cent of respondents had a broadly favourable view of the conduct of elections in their country (Birch, 2005). This may well be an additional effect of the use of predominantly proportional representation electoral systems, which have been found to promote electoral integrity in post-communist Europe (Birch, 2007b). It may also be due to the fact that since the collapse of communism, proportional representation has been associated with democracy and multipartism, which has bred a sense that this type of electoral system fosters electoral fairness.

At the same time, there are also a number of causes for concern about electoral processes in the Visegrad region, which suggest that quantitative indicators of party system consolidation such as those presented here do not tell the whole story. Questions of the ‘quality’ of participation, representation and governance are difficult to discern from quantitative data, as are perceptions of these processes. Likewise, while broad-brush comparative data allow us only to make broad generalisations about trends across states; they do not enable us to understand the causal dynamics of change within states. Quantitative comparative analyses must therefore be accompanied by case studies and qualitative studies if we are to have a true understanding of the underlying dynamics of

electoral and party competition. I shall close by briefly outlining some of the qualitative problems that I believe need to be addressed by scholars.

The frequent low levels of electoral participation in these countries may cause one to doubt whether electoral party politics is perceived as providing a satisfactory channel for people's interests, particularly in Poland, where only two in five eligible citizens took part in the parliamentary polls of 2005. Moreover, where disaffection with electoral politics is combined with high levels of political polarisation, the result may be outbursts of political activity that seeks to circumvent formal channels of political participation. Such 'unconventional' forms of participation have a part to play in any vibrant civil society, but where they lead to violence, as was the case recently in Hungary following Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany's admission that he had lied to the Hungarian people in order to get re-elected, this suggests that the system of formal representation is not doing its job.

Furthermore, as Gyurcsany himself suggested, lying is in some sense 'a crime of the entire Hungarian political elite',³ which, if true, indicates that post-communist politics has not succeeded in overcoming the 'culture of lies' that characterised communism. Hungary is surely not alone in facing this problem, which has caused considerably popular disillusionment and cynicism in recent years. A related concern is popular disaffection with politics due to the vitriolic style of political competition that is common in the Visegrad states, and which appears to have caused many voters to be turned off by party politics in general, and with parties' ability to achieve effective interest intermediation.

Another significant problem is the growth of populism and racism within the realm of party politics. Governing coalitions in Poland and Slovakia have both had to rely on parties that have voiced highly illiberal views about minority ethnic groups (the League of Polish Families and the Slovak National Party). This suggests that significant proportions of both the citizenry and the political elites of these states have not fully accepted the concept of civic inclusiveness that underlies democratic norms.

A third problem that has been faced by recent governments in the region is the difficulty of forming and maintaining coalitions, as has been clearest in recent months in Poland and the Czech Republic. As the figures of effective party size presented above suggest, this has little to do with the need for coalition government; parliaments in the Visegrad countries are hardly more fragmented than their Western European counterparts. It has more to do with the fact that, despite the dominance of list proportional representation in the electoral systems of this region, personalities still play a larger role than ideologies in many contexts, and politics is still perceived by many in terms of patronage and rent-seeking.

A final and related factor is the prevalence of corruption and its enduring place in the electoral discourse of all the states in the Visegrad region. Though, as noted above, specifically electoral fraud and abuse is largely absent from these countries, abuse of power by elected politicians appears to continue. It is of course difficult to evaluate allegations of corruption, which are often made for political ends, but it is fair to say that perceptions of corruption are widespread in Central Europe, and that they have led to

³ Quoted in Mark Almond, 'Truth in the Free Market', the *Guardian*, 20 September, 2006.

relatively high levels of distrust of elected politicians by ordinary people, which further contributes to the problem of disillusionment, low participation, the attraction of extreme alternatives.

But I do not want to end on a sour note. The Visegrad countries have made great strides in democratisation over the course of the past 17 years, and the findings presented in this paper suggest that they have largely succeeded in establishing and maintaining the formal institutions of democratic politics. This is no small achievement, as evidenced by the constitutional and territorial crises experienced by many of the post-communist states further to the South and East. What remains to be accomplished in the Visegrad countries is to imbue this democratic form with democratic content, in the sense of clean government, a commitment by politicians to negotiated outcomes that rest on policy compromises, and genuine civic engagement by the citizenries of these states. When this has been achieved, we will then be able to say that democracy has been truly consolidated in these countries. This recognition suggests that political scientists would do well to focus increasingly on qualitative indicators of democratic achievement, as this appears to be where the real challenge for the Visegrad states lies.

Table 1: Electoral System Effects in Post-Communist Europe

Country	Year of most recent election	Electoral system	Turnout (as % of registered voters)	% votes excluded from representation *	Effective number of parliamentary parties [†]	Seat share of the largest party
Albania	2005	Mixed (29% PR)	49.23%	9.14%	3.68	40.00%
Armenia	2003	Mixed (43% PR)	51.05%	17.81%	4.69	28.24%
Belarus	2004	SMD	90.14%	N/A	1.95	7.27%
Bosnia & H.	2002	PR	55.44%	2.52%	7.95	21.92%
Bulgaria	2005	PR	55.76%	8.91%	4.81	34.17%
Croatia	2003	PR	61.65%	12.90%	3.20 [*]	45.83%
Czech Rep.[‡]	2006	PR	64.47%	5.97%	3.10	40.50%
Estonia	2003	PR	58.24%	5.00%	4.67	27.72%
Georgia	2003/4	Mixed (67% PR)	63.93% [▼]	4.79%	2.00	68.81%
Hungary	2006	Mixed (54% PR)	67.57%	.09%	2.40	48.19%
Latvia	2006	PR	71.51%	15.99%	5.02	26.00%
Lithuania	2004	Mixed (50% PR)	46.07%	5.22%	5.46	27.66%
Macedonia	2006	PR	55.98%	8.96%	4.06	37.50%
Moldova	2005	PR	64.84%	16.42%	2.31	55.45%
Montenegro	2006	PR	72.05%	N/A	3.16	50.62%
Poland	2005	PR	40.57%	10.93%	4.26	33.70%
Romania	2004	PR	58.51%	11.97%	3.01 [*]	42.04%
Russia	2003	Mixed (50% PR) [‡]	55.67%	15.05%	2.32	52.36%
Serbia	2003	PR	58.75%	14.23%	4.80	32.80%
Slovakia[‡]	2006	PR	54.67%	11.97%	4.81	33.33%
Slovenia	2004	PR	60.64%	7.70%	4.90 [*]	32.22%
Ukraine	2006	PR	67.13%	22.34%	3.41	41.33%
Average	---	---	60.18%	10.40%	3.91	37.62%
Visegrad average	---	---	58.82%	7.24%	3.64	38.93%

♦ The effective number of parliamentary parties is calculated by taking the inverse of the sum of squares of the seat percentages won by each party. Seats won by independent candidates are excluded prior to the calculation of seat shares.

♣ Excludes minority representatives, who are separately elected.

♠ Czech and Slovak data for 1990 and 1992 are those of the National Council elections held in those years.

♥ This turnout figure is from the re-held 2004 elections.

* Figures for PR systems are based on the national-level proportional representation results; figures for mixed systems are the weighted average of exclusion in the national-level proportional representation and single-member district components of the system, with the exception of the compensatory Albanian system, as well as the Georgian, Lithuanian and Russian elections (for which SMD vote figures could not be obtained).

Sources: Calculated on the basis of data from: Birch, 2003b; www.electionguide.org; www.ipu.org; 'Republic of Albania Parliamentary Elections 3 July 2005: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Report', Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2005.

Table 2: Electoral Participation in the Visegrad Countries in the Post-Communist Period (Lower-House Parliamentary Elections)

Country	Last communist election	1 st election	2 nd election	3 rd election	4 th election	5 th election	6 th election
Czech Republic [♦]	99.4% [♦]	96.8%	85.1%	76.3%	73.9%	58.0%	64.5%
Hungary	93.3%	65.1%	68.9%	56.3%	70.5%	67.6%	
Poland [♦]	78.9%	43.2%	52.1%	47.9%	46.2%	40.6%	
Slovakia [♦]	99.4% [*]	95.4%	84.2%	75.7%	84.2%	70.1%	54.7%
Average	92.8%	75.1%	72.6%	64.1%	68.7%	59.1%	59.6%

[♦] For Czechoslovakia as a whole.

[♦] The Polish transitional election of 1989 is omitted.

[♦] Czech and Slovak data for 1990 and 1992 are those of the National Council elections held in those years.

Sources: Calculated on the basis of data from: Birch, 2003b; www.electionguide.org; www.ipu.org

Table 3: Levels of Electoral Exclusion in the Visegrad Countries in the Post-Communist Period (Lower-House Parliamentary Elections)

Country	1 st election	2 nd election	3 rd election	4 th election	5 th election	6 th election
Czech Republic [♦]	18.8%	19.1%	11.1%	11.3%	12.5%	6.0%
Hungary	16.0%	11.6%	9.5%	12.0%	.09%	
Poland	7.5%	35.1%	12.8%	9.4%	10.9%	
Slovakia [♦]	7.6%	23.8%	13.0%	5.8%	18.2%	12.0%
Average	12.5%	22.4%	11.6%	9.6%	10.42%	9.0%

[♦] Czech and Slovak data for 1990 and 1992 are those of the National Council elections held in those years.

NB: Figures for PR systems are based on the national-level proportional representation results; figures for Hungary are the weighted average of exclusion in the national-level proportional representation and single-member district components of the system.

Sources: Calculated on the basis of data from: Birch, 2003b; www.electionguide.org; www.ipu.org

Table 4: Effective Numbers of Parliamentary Parties in the Visegrad Countries in the Post-Communist Period (Lower-House Parliamentary Elections)

Country	1 st election	2 nd election	3 rd election	4 th election	5 th election	6 th election
Czech Republic [†]	2.22	4.80	4.15	3.70	3.67	3.10
Hungary	3.78	2.90	4.00	2.21	2.40	
Poland	10.89	3.88	2.95	3.60	4.26	
Slovakia [†]	4.99	3.19	6.97	4.76	6.12	4.81
Average	5.47	3.69	4.52	3.57	4.11	4.00

[†] Czech and Slovak data for 1990 and 1992 are those of the National Council elections held in those years.

Sources: Calculated on the basis of data from: Birch, 2003b; www.electionguide.org; www.ipu.org

Table 5: Seat Share of the Largest Party in the Visegrad Countries in the Post-Communist Period (Lower-House Parliamentary Elections)

Country	1 st election	2 nd election	3 rd election	4 th election	5 th election	6 th election
Czech Republic [†]	63.50%	38.00%	34.00%	37.00%	35.00%	40.50%
Hungary	42.49%	54.15%	38.34%	48.70%	48.19%	
Poland	13.47%	37.17%	43.69%	46.96%	33.70%	
Slovakia [†]	32.00%	49.33%	40.67%	28.67%	24.00%	33.33%
Average	37.87%	44.66%	39.18%	40.33%	35.22%	36.92%

[†] Czech and Slovak data for 1990 and 1992 are those of the National Council elections held in those years.

Sources: Calculated on the basis of data from: Birch, 2003b; www.electionguide.org; www.ipu.org

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